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Institutional design can itself politicize technocratic oversight

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Research area:law-regulationregulation-compliance

What the study found

The study finds that politicization in non-majoritarian institutions can stem from institutional design itself, not only from outside pressure or poor performance. It introduces the idea of design-based politicization to describe this process.

Why the authors say this matters

The authors conclude that their findings reveal the contradictions of depoliticization and help explain when and why technocratic oversight bodies become contested. They suggest this is relevant to understanding contestation within and beyond Europe.

What the researchers tested

The article uses interview and document material to examine the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board, which is described as a case of technocratic oversight in regulatory governance. It looks at how structural features intended to depoliticize decision-making may produce conflict.

What worked and what didn't

The analysis identifies three design-related mechanisms linked to politicization: delegation ambiguity, mandate contradictions, and weak throughput legitimacy. The abstract does not report numerical results or compare these mechanisms in detail.

What to keep in mind

The available summary does not describe study limitations in detail. The findings are presented from a single critical case, so the abstract does not state how broadly they apply beyond the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board.

Key points

  • The study argues that politicization can arise from institutional design features, not only external pressure.
  • It introduces the concept of design-based politicization.
  • The case examined is the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board.
  • Three mechanisms are identified: delegation ambiguity, mandate contradictions, and weak throughput legitimacy.
  • The abstract says the findings clarify when and why technocratic oversight bodies become contested.

Disclosure

Research title:
Institutional design can itself politicize technocratic oversight
Authors:
Brigitte Pircher
Institutions:
Södertörn University
Publication date:
2026-03-08
DOI:
10.1111/rego.70139
OpenAlex record:
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AI provenance: This post was generated by gpt-5.4-mini (OpenAI). The original authors did not write or review this post.

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