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Tag: Philosophy of Science

  • Frege’s anti-psychologism and evolutionary logic are discussed together

    Frege’s anti-psychologism and evolutionary logic are discussed together

    What the study found

    The paper argues that Frege’s anti-psychologism, the view that logic should not depend on psychology, may be compatible with evolutionary explanations of logical reasoning. It also suggests that bringing these ideas together could open new directions in the discipline.

    Why the authors say this matters

    The authors say the study matters because the relationship between logic and evolutionist theses has been obscured, and they see value in reconsidering it. They suggest that this reconciliation may help preserve the objective character Frege assigned to logic while addressing evolutionary accounts of human reasoning.

    What the researchers tested

    The article examines Frege’s philosophy of logic and mathematics, especially his anti-psychologism. It then considers whether the thesis that our logical reasoning abilities arose through evolutionary advantage can be reconciled with that objective view of logic.

    What worked and what didn't

    According to the abstract, Frege’s critique of psychologism in logic was successful, and psychological approaches largely disappeared from 20th-century formal logic. The paper presents reconciliation with evolutionary theses as a possibility, but the abstract does not report empirical tests or a definitive resolution.

    What to keep in mind

    The abstract does not provide detailed arguments, examples, or formal proofs, so the scope of the conclusion is limited to the claims stated there. It also does not describe limitations beyond noting that the paper is exploring a possibility rather than reporting a settled result.

    • Frege’s anti-psychologism holds that logic should not depend on psychological methods.
    • The abstract says psychologism in logic largely disappeared in 20th-century formal logic.
    • The paper asks whether evolutionary explanations of logical reasoning can fit with logic’s objective character.
    • The authors suggest this reconciliation may open new directions in logic.
    • No empirical study or definitive conclusion is described in the abstract.

  • Logic’s neutrality is framed as theory closure

    What the study found

    The authors conclude that logic’s neutrality can be understood in terms of theory closure, if the idea is interpreted correctly. They present this as a way to make sense of the view that logic imposes no significant constraints on the world.

    Why the authors say this matters

    The study suggests that viewing logic as a tool for theory building helps explain what logic’s neutrality means. The authors also connect this account to the distinction between validity and truth, and to broader issues in the philosophy of logic.

    What the researchers tested

    The paper examines a proposal originally sketched by Jc Beall and develops it for the question of logic’s neutrality. The authors use a metalinguistic framework and discuss the deduction theorem and the relationship between entailment and implication.

    What worked and what didn't

    The authors argue that mere theory closure can serve as a hallmark of logic’s neutrality. They also discuss complications and possible objections, but the abstract does not specify which objections were decisive or which parts of the account failed.

    What to keep in mind

    The abstract provides a conceptual argument rather than empirical evidence. It does not give detailed limitations, and the precise force of the proposal depends, as the authors note, on correct interpretation.

    • The authors conclude that logic’s neutrality can be understood through theory closure.
    • The paper treats logic as a tool for theory building.
    • The account is linked to a distinction between validity and truth.
    • A metalinguistic framework is used to develop the proposal.
    • The authors discuss the deduction theorem and the relation between entailment and implication.

  • Arbitrary reference conflicts with weak discernibility

    What the study found

    The author argues that the theory of arbitrary reference is inconsistent with the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. Weakly discernible entities are described as entities that share all intrinsic and relational properties, yet stand in a symmetric and irreflexive relation.

    Why the authors say this matters

    The study suggests this is important because the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible is presented as plausible and supported by several arguments. The authors conclude that if that thesis is true, then the theory of arbitrary reference is false, and some claimed applications of the theory would also fail.

    What the researchers tested

    The paper examines the theory of arbitrary reference, first proposed by Breckenridge and Magidor in 2012, and compares it with the thesis about weakly discernible entities. The article is a philosophical argument rather than an empirical study.

    What worked and what didn't

    According to the abstract, the argument supports the claim that arbitrary reference cannot be combined with the metaphysical possibility of weakly discernible entities. The abstract also states that two kinds of consequences follow for advocates of arbitrary reference: the theory would be false if the thesis is true, and some proposed applications, including those used by ante rem structuralists, would fail.

    What to keep in mind

    The abstract gives only the author's argument and does not describe counterarguments, tests, or detailed evidence. It also does not provide a full account of all applications of arbitrary reference, only noting that some depend on the disputed thesis.

    • The paper argues that arbitrary reference is inconsistent with the metaphysical possibility of weakly discernible entities.
    • Weakly discernible entities are defined as sharing all intrinsic and relational properties while standing in a symmetric and irreflexive relation.
    • The abstract says the thesis about weakly discernible entities is strikingly plausible and supported by several arguments.
    • The author claims that if that thesis is true, then arbitrary reference is false.
    • The abstract says some applications of arbitrary reference, including for ante rem structuralists, depend on the disputed thesis.

  • Reinachian internalism is defended against externalism

    What the study found

    The paper argues for Reinachian internalism about speech acts: a speech act can be performed even if the addressee does not take it up. The author contrasts this with externalism, which treats uptake by the hearer as necessary for the act to exist as a speech act.

    Why the authors say this matters

    The authors conclude that internalism is preferable because externalism conflicts with three claims they treat as important: avoiding retroactive changes to an act's nature, distinguishing performance from mere attempt, and separating motivating from normative reasons. The study suggests this is a better account of what it is for a speech act to be performed.

    What the researchers tested

    This is a philosophical argument article rather than an empirical study. It first distinguishes between the performance of a speech act, described as an atomic event, and its product, described as a continuant, and then presents three arguments in defense of Reinach's view.

    What worked and what didn't

    The paper argues that internalism avoids the metaphysical problem of an act's nature changing retroactively based on later events. It also argues that internalism better distinguishes performing a speech act from merely trying to perform one, and preserves the difference between motivating and normative reasons.

    What to keep in mind

    The abstract provides no empirical data or experiments, so the claims are defended by philosophical argument alone. No limitations are described in the available summary beyond the scope of the conceptual debate.

    • The paper defends Reinachian internalism about speech acts.
    • It argues that uptake by the addressee is not required for a speech act to be performed.
    • The author contrasts performance of a speech act with its product, calling the former an atomic event and the latter a continuant.
    • Three arguments are offered against externalism: no retroactive change in an act's nature, a clearer performance/attempt distinction, and a distinction between motivating and normative reasons.
    • The article is a philosophical defense, not an empirical study.

  • A new argument supports the law of non-contradiction

    What the study found

    The study presents a new argument for the principle that there are no true contradictions, also called the law of non-contradiction. The abstract says the argument is valid in a wide range of logics, including some paraconsistent logics, which are logics that allow some contradictions without making everything true.

    Why the authors say this matters

    The authors conclude that the argument offers a logic-neutral justification of the law of non-contradiction. The study suggests this is important because the argument does not depend mainly on a single logical system.

    What the researchers tested

    The paper offers a new argument for a philosophical principle about contradiction. According to the abstract, the argument relies mostly on extra-logical premises, meaning premises outside formal logic itself.

    What worked and what didn't

    The abstract says the argument works as a valid argument in a wide range of logics. It also says this includes certain paraconsistent logics, so the argument is not limited to standard classical logic.

    What to keep in mind

    The available summary does not describe the specific premises, the full argument, or any objections considered. It also does not provide details about which logics were included beyond saying that some paraconsistent logics were among them.

    • The paper presents a new argument for the law of non-contradiction.
    • The argument is said to be valid across a wide range of logics.
    • The abstract says it includes certain paraconsistent logics.
    • The argument relies mostly on extra-logical premises.
    • The authors describe the result as a logic-neutral justification.

  • The commentary questions Parfit’s temporal neutrality

    What the study found

    The article argues that there are more fundamental reasons to reject Derek Parfit’s endorsement of temporal neutrality than those based on relationships. It also notes Samuel Scheffler’s conditional acceptance of a revised version of Parfit’s “excellent argument.”

    Why the authors say this matters

    The authors suggest that the issue goes beyond relationships, and that this has implications for how Parfit’s view of temporal neutrality should be assessed. They frame this as a challenge to Parfit’s endorsement of temporal neutrality.

    What the researchers tested

    This is a commentary on Samuel Scheffler’s book, One Life to Lead, with a focus on chapter 2. The piece examines Scheffler’s response to a revised form of Parfit’s “excellent argument.”

    What worked and what didn't

    According to the abstract, Scheffler conditionally accepts a revised version of Parfit’s argument. The commentary then argues that this acceptance does not settle the issue, because there are deeper reasons to reject temporal neutrality.

    What to keep in mind

    The abstract provides only a brief summary of the argument and does not give the detailed reasoning used in the commentary. It also does not describe empirical methods or report data.

    • The article is a commentary on Samuel Scheffler’s One Life to Lead.
    • It focuses on chapter 2 of Scheffler’s book.
    • Scheffler is described as conditionally accepting a revised form of Parfit’s “excellent argument.”
    • The commentary argues that there are more fundamental reasons to reject Parfit’s endorsement of temporal neutrality.
    • No empirical methods or data are described in the abstract.